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In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular in Western-Africa, in rural
areas and for girls, school enrolment rates are very low. Very often policy
interventions designed to increase enrolment in this region still have a strong
emphasis on the supply side, such as enhancing school construction, the training
of teachers and revisions of the curriculum. However, a number of studies have
emphasized the importance of household income when parents have to decide
whether or not to send their children to school (e.g. Deininger 2003; Glewwe and
Jacoby, 2004; Cogneau and Jedwab, 2008). Household income has been shown
to matter in particular in settings where households face liquidity constraints,
caused by the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to smooth consumption
through credit and savings (e.g. Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Beegle, Dehejia and
Gatti, 2006). In such a context recurrent shocks to household income frequently
force households to withdraw their children from school or not to enroll them in
the first place (e.g. Jensen, 2000; Yamano, Alderman and Christiaensen, 2005).
However, so far not much effort has been made to quantify the causal impact
of income on school enrolment in the Sub-Saharan African context. A notable
exception is Cogneau and Jedwab (2008). The empirical problem in analyzing
the relationship between school attainment and family income is to control for
parental ability, which is largely unobserved, and to deal with reverse causality
and measurement error.
Now and in the coming years a lot of resources are being allocated by gov-
ernments and donors to increase school enrolment in that region.2 Hence infor-
mation about the income effects on schooling decisions is important in deciding
how to spend these resources in the most effective way. Well designed and tar-
geted policies that support income directly or indirectly, for instance through
investments in agricultural productivity or policies that reduce the direct or
indirect costs of schooling, have to complement supply-side orientated policies
and need to be based on rigorous evidence with respect to the income elasticity
of enrolment. This elasticity is also important to design safety nets that could
protect children’s schooling in case households are hit by income shocks due,
for instance, to weather fluctuations, crop disease, illness or mortality.
To identify the causal impact of household income on investments in chil-
dren’s education in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, I rely on a natural
experiment in Burkina Faso, a poor landlocked and largely agricultural econ-
omy in the middle of West-Africa. I use the fact that cotton farmers on the
one hand and food crop farmers on the other hand experienced quite different
income movements in the mid-nineties. The findings of this paper suggest that
a decline in income by ten percent causes a decline in enrolment rates among
children aged six to thirteen by about 2.5 percentage points for boys and 3
percentage points for girls. This impact is more than three times higher than
what a simple OLS regression would suggest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
2About 3.5 Billion USD (2007 prices and exchange rates) of bilateral and multilateral aid
are currently allocated to the education sector (OECD International Development Statistics,
see http://www.oecd.org).
2
short review of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the economic context
in Burkina Faso and provides some information about the education system.
Section 4 presents some theoretical considerations underlying the empirical part
of the paper. Section 5 presents the data source. Section 6 first analyzes
descriptively the effect of an income shock on schooling and child work and then
estimates the causal effect of income on school enrolment. Section 7 concludes.
2 A review of the literature
Various papers have analyzed the impact of transitory and unanticipated in-
come shocks on outcomes related to children’s education and health in poor
rural settings. The theoretical background of these papers is that under liq-
uidity constraints, caused by the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to
smooth consumption through credit and savings, the standard human capital
investment model of child labor and schooling decisions introduced by Schultz
(1960) and formalized by Ben-Porath (1967) does not apply. As pointed out by
Baland and Robinson (2000), if parents face such constraints then, in the event
of a negative shock, they have to trade off the future benefits of educating their
children against their current consumption needs. Therefore children are either
not enrolled into or drop out of school in order to save on the direct costs of
schooling (such as school fees, textbooks and uniforms), to contribute to house-
hold income and to help maintain current consumption, even if the long term
return on child labor is below the return on education.
In what follows, two related strands of the literature are briefly reviewed:
First, research that analyzes the impact of shocks, in particular rainfall shocks,
on farm production and on human capital investment like education and health.
Second, research that proposes structural estimates of the income elasticity of
school enrolment in low and middle income countries. Some contributions to
the second group use, as this paper does, economic shocks as an exogenous
variation in income to produce such estimates.
Jacoby (1994) was one of the first who empirically showed that income
shocks can have a notable impact on school attendance in poor settings. He
emphasized that this effect stemmed mainly from those households which were
credit constrained. Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) focused in particular on the im-
pact of seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households. Using panel
data from India, the authors found that small farm households were inade-
quately insured ex ante, and, hence, unanticipated income shocks significantly
affected children’s school attendance. They also found that households, again
in particular smaller farm households, faced serious credit market constraints,
sometimes combined with limited storage opportunities, which again had ad-
verse impacts on children’s school attendance. Kazianga (2005) used similar
panel data for six villages in rural Burkina Faso, the country on which this
paper also focuses. He showed that for households without any access to in-
surance the frequency of income shocks, as measured by the predicted income
variance, reduced educational investments in boys and, in particular, in girls.
Jensen (2000) showed that in Coˆte d’Ivoire rainfall shocks affected adversely
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investments in children’s health and education. He found, at least in the short
term, large effects with school enrolment rates declining by between one-third
and one-half and malnutrition doubling. Yamano et al. (2005) provided similar
evidence for Ethiopia.
Beegle et al. (2006) used panel data for Tanzania to examine the extent
to which transitory income shocks led to increases in child labor and whether
household’s asset holdings mitigated the effects of these shocks. They found
that crop shocks led to a significant increase in the level of child labor, but
that households with assets were able to offset at least a large part of that
shock. Richer households tended to prefer to use their assets as collateral
against credit, whereas poorer households tended to prefer to use them as a
buffer. However, school enrolment decreased less than expected because many
children were able to combine school and work. Kruger (2007), in turn, exam-
ined positive shocks, namely increases in county-level value of coffee production
in Brazil. She shows, interestingly, that these shocks led to more work among
middle-income boys and girls, poorer children were withdrawn from school,
while richer children were not affected. Hence, this study highlighted the po-
tential importance of substitution effects in periods of economic growth. In such
periods the opportunity cost of schooling rises and in consequence education
may be adversely affected. Maccini and Yang (2009) focused on the long run
effects of such shocks. They examined the effect of weather conditions around
the time of birth on the health, education, and socioeconomic outcomes of In-
donesian adults. They showed that higher early-life rainfall had large positive
effects on education, health and asset holdings of women, but not of men.
All these studies above, excepting Kruger (2007), show convincingly that the
level and variance of household income matter for children’s human capital in-
vestments if households have only limited insurance and limited possibilities to
smooth their consumption through credit and savings. However, these studies
usually do not attempt to provide a structural estimate of the income elasticity
of enrolment, and, in particular, to disentangle the effect of income from family
background and parental education. Yet, knowing this elasticity is important
when designing policy interventions. Behrman and Wolfe (1984, 1987) under-
took this separation using sibling data for Nicaragua. They showed that the
impact of parental education is strongly reduced once family fixed effects are
introduced. They did not find an effect of various measures of parental income
on children’s schooling. Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) examined the relationship
between consumption expenditure, which was used as a proxy for household
wealth, and the demand for education using panel data for Vietnam. They in
turn found a positive and significant relationship between changes in wealth and
changes in secondary school enrolment. This effect is shown to be robust to the
inclusion of locality-specific factors such as changes in education returns and
the supply and quality of schools, and for the opportunity costs of schooling.
Deininger (2003) analyzed the impact of a program aimed at eliminating the
cost of primary education in Uganda. He concluded that the program led to a
strong increase in enrolment, showing that direct costs to schooling constituted
a significant obstacle to school attendance, and that as long as such costs are
high, parental income is an important determinant of children’s enrolment.
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Other studies relied on natural experiments, as this study will do. Rucci
(2004) looked at changes in enrolment rates during the Argentinean crisis and
instruments household income by the lagged Brazilian Real-US Dollar exchange
rate. She also found the IV estimate, depending on age and gender of the child,
to be two to seven times larger than the OLS estimate. Cogneau and Jedwab
(2008) took cocoa price shocks in Coˆte d’Ivoire as an instrument for income
and explored the difference in investments in children’s education and health
in families of cocoa and food crop farmers. Regarding the effects on education,
they also found strong income effects.
This paper contributes in two ways to the literature discussed above. First,
it provides further evidence that unanticipated transitory shocks to (real) house-
hold income have an immediate effect on children’s school enrolment, suggesting
that other risk-coping instruments are insufficient. Second, it provides a rela-
tively accurate estimate of the causal impact of household income on children’s
school enrolment in a very poor rural African setting.
3 Background
3.1 Agricultural production and prices
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world. GDP per capita is
estimated at only PPP US$ 1,213 and according to the Human Development
Index (HDI), the country was ranked 177th out of 182 countries (UNDP, 2009).
The bad performance in terms of the HDI is in particular caused by a very low
education index. The country is landlocked in the middle of West-Africa and
has a population of roughly 13.4 million. The country depends highly on cotton
exports, which account for almost 60 percent of total export earnings, as well
as on international aid. More than 80 percent of the Burkinabe` population lives
in rural areas working predominantly in the agricultural sector, which suffers
from very limited rainfall and recurrent severe droughts.
Figure 1 shows that as a result of the severe drought in 1997/98 total pro-
duction of the three main food crops—sorghum, millet and maize—decreased
by almost 20 percent. Although the production of maize increased during that
period, given its relative low weight in food consumption, maize production
could not compensate for the decline in millet and sorghum production. These
food crops account in normal times for about 30 percent of total expenditure
(including imputed expenditures for own production) for rural households in
the poorest quintile of the expenditure distribution. At the same time cotton
production increased by more than 80 percent.
[insert Figure 1]
Figure 2 shows that the prices of cereals rose tremendously between 1994
and 1998. This rise was caused first of all by the production shortage following
the drought. But even before that drought prices tended to rise due to rising
input prices after the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 and a lack of
productivity increases in cereal production, accompanied by continuous high
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population growth. In some years a high demand for cereals from neighboring
countries also put pressure on prices in Burkina Faso.
[insert Figure 2]
Following the devaluation and the favorable development of the world mar-
ket price of cotton, the Burkinabe` cotton marketing board ‘Socie´te´ Burkinabe`
des fibres textiles’ (SOFITEX), which was in place at that time,3 increased the
producer price in several steps. Despite the fact that the costs of inputs also
increased, as most of them have to be imported, the rise in producer prices still
provided enough incentives to expand cotton production, mainly by the expan-
sion of land allocated to cotton production (Grimm and Gu¨nther, 2007a).
After 1998 cereal prices fell back to lower levels, before rising again due to a
second drought in 2000/01. The immediate consequences of the second drought
are difficult to assess, since household survey data only exists for 1994, 1998
and 2003. As Figure 1 shows, in 2002 cereal production had already recovered
and prices for millet and sorghum in particular were significantly lower in 2002
than in 1998.
Obviously such price hikes in food staples can always have two types of
consequences. Households who are net producers of these cereals will benefit,
i.e. the income effect will more than outweigh the price effect. Households who
are net consumers will, in turn, suffer real income losses. Household survey data
for 1998 shows that in rural areas 94 percent of all households produced cereals,
but only 15 percent sold any on the market. In contrast, the share of purchased
cereals in total cereal consumption was on average 49 percent (Grimm and
Gu¨nther, 2007a). Thus, in rural Burkina Faso most of the households are losers
of such price increases, in particular in periods of harvest failures since this
obviously means also lower output.4
It is important to emphasize that the cereal prices shown in Figure 2 are
consumer and not producer prices. The latter are often much lower given the
negotiation power of traders and the information asymmetries prevailing be-
tween traders and farmers. Also, farmers do often not have appropriate storage
facilities and thus are forced to sell their cereals directly after the harvest, re-
sulting in a fall in prices. Traders on the other hand, are able to store cereals,
to speculate in the market and to drive the price up by allocating their supply
over the whole year.
3.2 Schooling system
In Burkina Faso basic education includes pre-school classes for a maximum
duration of three years; normally children from three to six years of age can
attend. Primary school starts officially at the age of seven and lasts in total
six years. Secondary school is comprised of two types of curricula: the general
3At that time SOFITEX was the only importer of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer
and pesticides and the only buyer of cotton. For a detailed description of the sector, see e.g.
Kaminski (2007).
4See Reardon, Matlon and Delgado (1988) for similar evidence on Burkina Faso
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curriculum and a technical curriculum. Lower secondary education lasts four
years. General higher secondary education lasts three years. Technical higher
secondary education can be three years (long) or two years (short). Successful
completion of general higher secondary education enables entry into tertiary
education.
In principle school is compulsory for the age group six to sixteen. But
the law explicitly states that this is conditional on the availability of schools,
teaching material and teachers. De facto, many children never go to school or
if they do, only for a few years, particularly in rural areas. In addition, school
entry is often delayed, repetition rates are high and there is still an important,
although decreasing, gender gap in rural areas.
The schooling system is comprised of public and private schools. Private
schools charge fees. Public schools are always free of charge and parents only
have to buy text books, school supplies and a school uniform. Until 2007 it
was also custom that parents paid 1,000 CFA Francs (about 10 PPP US$) each
year into the parents’ association. However, this was abolished in 2007. Today,
public and private schools receive text books from the government.
4 Theoretical considerations
It is assumed that the typical rural agricultural household in Burkian Faso is
liquidity constrained, given the lack of insurance and limited possibilities to
smooth consumption through credit and savings. Empirical evidence for Burk-
ina Faso supporting this assumption has been provided by Kazianga and Udry
(2006) and Reardon et al. (1996). It is further assumed that children’s future
earnings are positively related to their educational investments and influence
positively current parental utility.
In such a setting, and if farmers are net consumers of food crops, a rise in
food crop prices should have a negative impact on real income and reduce edu-
cational investment. This may be partly offset by the fact that direct schooling
costs (e.g. expenses for textbooks, school supplies, uniforms and transport)
decline relative to food prices. However, in our case described above this sub-
stitution effect should be small relative to the income effect and thus can be
neglected. If the wage for child work also goes up, the indirect cost of school-
ing rises and lowers schooling further, but this also depends on the change in
opportunity costs for older children and adults. However, in Burkina Faso,
most children, if they work, work on the family farm. Given that the hike in
food prices was caused by a serious shortfall of production, it is unlikely that
children’s productivity on food crop farms, and hence their (implicit) wages,
increased. A third potentially relevant channel is the effect of food prices on
returns to schooling. Nevertheless, given the temporary nature of the food price
shock and given that investments in education are seen as a route to more lucra-
tive employment outside agriculture, this channel does not seem very relevant
in the setting of this study.
If, in contrast, households are net producers of food crops, they may have
experienced a positive income effect, if the price increase over compensated the
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decline in production. In this case enrolment should have gone up. However,
as the analysis of the context above has shown, only very few households in
Burkina Faso fall into this category.
But, and more importantly, given the simultaneous boom of cotton prices,
the main export crop in Burkina Faso, children in cotton producing households,
in turn, should have experienced a smaller depression of real income, given that
additional income from cotton production should have mitigated the negative
effect on real income that resulted from the hike in food prices. However, rising
cotton prices, which in this case where also accompanied by rising production
quantities, should have raised the opportunity cost of children’s time too and
therefore, may have, in turn, lowered the schooling of these children. The effect
of cotton prices and cotton production on the long run returns to schooling are
again supposed to be negligible.
Hence, linking these theoretical considerations to the context described
above, in particular the fact that between 1994 and 1998 food crop farmers
and cotton farmers experienced a substantially different development of (real)
household income, one would expect that the loss in purchasing power for food
crop farmers would have led to a substantial decline in school enrolment of
children in these households. In contrast, school enrolment of children living in
cotton households should have been affected less, given the boom in that sec-
tor. The latter is of course only true as long as the income effect is higher than
the substitution effect, i.e. children living in cotton households were not put
to work more often given the possibly increased opportunity cost of schooling.
This latter issue will be addressed below too.
5 Data
I use three nationwide representative household survey data sets, so-called
Enqueˆte Prioritaires (EP), undertaken in 1994 (EP I), 1998 (EP II) and 2003
(EP III) covering around 8,500 households in each year. These surveys were con-
ducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et de la De´mographie (INSD)
with technical and financial support by the World Bank. These surveys contain
relatively detailed information on households’ socio-demographic characteris-
tics, education, employment, agricultural and non-agricultural activities as well
as consumption, income and some assets. A detailed description of these data
sets can be found in Grimm and Gu¨nther (2007b).
In these surveys households are defined as a group of people that live to-
gether, share their meals together and acknowledge the authority of one person,
called the household head. Individuals are only counted as household members
if during the past 12 months they spent at least 6 months in the household.5
Visitors and personnel are not counted as household members in the analysis.
Information on school enrolment is provided for all children older than five
years. However, it is important to note that in the 2003 survey the question on
5However, there are three exceptions: The household head is always considered as a house-
hold member as are new-born children and women that joined the household through marriage.
All others are considered as visitors.
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school enrolment was formulated differently than in 1994 and 1998. Whereas
in 1994 and 1998 the survey asked whether ‘a person was enrolled in school
in 1994/1995 and 1997/98 respectively’, i.e. in the current school year, the
2003 survey asked whether ‘a person was currently enrolled in school’. Given
that about a third of all households were interviewed in July, i.e. during the
school holidays it may be the case that many reported ‘no enrolment although
the child was still enrolled before the summer holidays; and children that were
supposed to start after the holidays were not yet reported as enrolled.6 Hence,
the analysis of the causal effect of income on enrolment will only rely on the
surveys undertaken in 1994 and 1998. All surveys also asked all individuals
who ever attended school for the highest education level ever achieved. But
the surveys did not ask about the data of school drop outs. For children ten
years and older, the surveys also inform whether a child worked, e.g. on the
household’s farm or non-farm business or outside the household.
Given the usual low quality of income data in poor rural settings, I use
household expenditure per capita as a measure of households’ income. House-
hold expenditures include all expenditures by the household for all household
members, including auto-consumption and received transfers in-kind both eval-
uated at market prices as well as transfers in cash and in-kind given to other
households. Hence, it is a measure of disposable resources. The expenditure
module of the questionnaire has different sections in which subsequently expen-
ditures for food and non-food items including expenditure for health, education
and transfers are reported. The recall period for food-times is either 15 or
30 days, for all other items it is 6 or 12 months. All expenditures are scaled
to yearly expenditures. Expenditures were deflated over time and space using
temporal and regional price deflators. Given the changes in relative prices in
the second half of the nineties mentioned above, e.g. the substantial rise in
cereal prices and the significant differences in consumption habits across the
income distribution, I use decile-specific price indices to deflate expenditures
over time. Using only the general consumer price index would over-estimate
the living standard of the poor. This is shown in detail in Grimm and Gu¨nther
(2007b, 2007c).
All those farmers who produced at least one kg of cotton in the survey year
are coded as cotton farmers. Most of these farmers also produce some food
crops. All other farmers are coded as food crop farmers. However, I will test
the sensitivity of that definition to alternative assumptions. It should be noted
that cotton farmers are, similarly to food crop farmers, usually small family
farms with in most cases not more than a few hectares of land.
In what follows I restrict my sample to two relatively homogenous and well
defined groups, namely food crop farmers and cotton farmers, and exclude pure
livestock farmers and all other socio-economic groups. I only consider rural
areas and limit the sample to households in the South and South-West of the
country (regions of Hauts-Bassins, Sud-Ouest, Cascades, and the southern parts
6Indeed, comparing the survey information with official data on gross and net enrolment
rates provided by the Ministe`re de l’Enseignement de Base et de l’Alphabe´tisataion for the
school years 1997/98 and 2002/03 I find that the 2003 survey underestimates enrolment, in
particular in provinces with a high share of cotton farmers.
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of Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre Ouest, Centre Sud, Centre Est and Est), exclud-
ing the relatively dry tropical savannah in the north.7 Applying those criteria
reduces the sample to in total 6,610 households for all three years together.
Although one can find cotton cultivation almost everywhere in the country, in
this area more than 80 percent of the total cotton exports are produced.
6 Empirical Evidence
6.1 Income
Table 1 shows the development of real household expenditure per capita. For
the reasons given above, I focus on the period 1994 to 1998. The shock on cereal
output and the resulting food price inflation reducing the purchasing power of
households are clearly visible. On average expenditures decreased by almost
24 percent in real terms. Comparing cotton farmers with food crop farmers,
one can state that both groups had a similar living standard in 1994. Then,
between 1994 and 1998 real expenditures of food crop farmers decreased by
almost 30 percent, whereas the real expenditure of cotton farmers decreased by
‘only’ 16 percent. Between 1998 and 2003, both groups again saw a very similar
growth rate of about 37 percent over the whole period lifting food crop farmers
and cotton farmers to expenditure levels of CFA Francs 59,400 and CFA Francs
71,000 respectively (not shown in Table).
[insert Table 1]
6.2 School enrolment
Enrolment rates for boys and girls six to thirteen years old (regular age of at-
tending primary school) in 1994 and 1998 for both types of farmers are shown
in Table 1. While in 1994 there are no differences in enrolment rates between
boys and girls in cotton farmer and food crop farmer households, in 1998 enrol-
ment rates were significantly lower in the latter compared to the former. The
development over time is even more distinct for the age group ten to thirteen
years old, since for this group enrollment in cotton farmer households even
increased, however, starting from a lower level. This in turn means that the
observed decline for the whole group of children in cotton households is mainly
driven by delayed entry of six-year old children or drop outs during the first
four years. School enrolment is further analyzed in Table 2, now including the
2003 data set. Column (1) shows the temporal pattern of enrolment rates of
children living either in food crop or cotton farmer households. This pattern
is obtained by regressing enrolment status on cotton and year dummies and
7The narrow spatial and socio-economic definition of both groups to be compared ensures
that this comparison is not affected by other shocks which might have occurred during that
time. For instance, livestock farmers faced a different development in their production and in
prices than pure food crop farmers. Urban households have suffered more under the price rise
of imported food items than have rural households. Moreover, in the North there are only few
cotton farmers, which would make a comparison with other farmers in this area somewhat
fragile.
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cotton and year interaction terms. The regression also controls for age (coeffi-
cients not presented), relationship to the household head i.e. child of the head
or not (coefficient not presented), gender and the interaction of gender, cotton
and year effects.
[insert Table 2]
The results suggest that children in cotton households have, on average,
the same probability to be enrolled as children in food crop households. The
cotton dummy is not statistically significant. In 1998 children as a whole were
significantly less likely to be enrolled than in 1994 and 2003. In that year
the enrolment probability was on average 8.1 percent lower than in the two
other years. The decline in enrolment thus coincides with the drought-induced
crisis. There is no evidence, that for instance other shocks that would have
depressed returns to education in the public or private formal sector led to
this decline.8 However, for children in cotton households this effect was on
average much lower. The corresponding coefficient of the cotton-year interaction
indicates that in 1998 these children had a probability to be enrolled which
was higher by 6.4 percent. This interaction effect is insignificant in 2003.9
However, as discussed above the 2003 data has to be used with caution, given
the slightly different question on school enrolment, which probably implies an
underestimation of enrolment in that year.
The other control variables indicate, as one can expect in the given context,
that boys have, in general, a higher probability to be enrolled in school than
girls. But it is interesting to see that in 1998 girls’ enrolment was less affected
than boys’ enrolment. This could be explained by the higher opportunity costs
for the schooling for boys. Below I will analyze this issue in more detail. How-
ever, it should already be noted that the interaction term of ‘being a boy’ and
‘being a child of a cotton household’ is insignificant. That suggests that in
this age group boys in cotton households are on average not more likely to be
enrolled than boys in food crop households.
6.3 Education expenditures
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 show the development over time of schooling
expenditures per household member and per child. These direct schooling costs
account on average for about 2.5 percent of the total household budget. The
results in Table 2 are consistent with the impact observed for school enrolment:
a general decline in schooling expenditures in 1998, but a positive and highly
significant impact of the cotton-year interaction term in 1998. Thus in 1998
cotton households reduced their schooling expenditures significantly less than
food crop farmers. The linear year effect in combination with the interaction
effect even suggest that there was no reduction at all for children in cotton
8Public and private formal employment and wages were relatively stable during that period,
see Grimm and Gu¨nther (2007a).
9The results are qualitatively the same, if a probit model is estimated.
11
households. The cotton dummy is insignificant in column (2) and weakly sig-
nificant in column (3), i.e. in normal times, there is hardly any difference in
schooling expenditures between food crop and cotton farmers.
6.4 Child work
Table 1 shows that child work is relatively widespread among children ten to
thirteen years old, in 1994 slightly more often among children in cotton house-
holds compared to children in food crop households. In the study area on
average more than 70 percent of all children do some work without attending
school and another five to ten percent combine school and work. Children who
work usually help on the family farm (more than 90 percent of all cases). Work
outside the household is rather an exception. Between 1994 and 1998, child
work declined for boys and girls in cotton households and increased in food
crop households. The associated double-difference is highly significant. Table
3 shows the results of a linear probability model, where the dependant variable
takes the value one if the child was reported to work during the past seven
days. Given that some children (about four percent) work and go to school, I
estimate two models; one where ‘school and work’ is counted as work (col. (2))
and one where ‘school and work’ is counted as school (col. (3)). The surveys do
not contain any information on working hours. Children were only asked what
the principal activity was; but for those working and attending school it was
not asked whether one or the other activity was the main activity. Information
on activities other than schooling is available for children ten years and older.
Hence, I include the age group ten to thirteen in the regression. This is different
to the age group considered in Table 2, but it still refers to children in primary
school. I use the same control variables as in Table 2. To facilitate comparisons,
column 1 in Table 3 re-estimates the enrollment model of Table 2 for the age
group ten to thirteen years old.
[insert Table 3]
The regression results confirm that in this age group children in cotton
households worked more often than children in food crop households. More-
over, in 1998 all children were more likely to work than to be at school (plus
13 to 17 percent). However, the cotton-time interaction shows that in 1998
children in cotton households were relatively to the other years much less likely
than children in food crop households to work. This effect is highly significant
and fully offsets for that group the year effect. In 2003 these differential ef-
fects between children in cotton and food crop households disappeared again.
Regarding the gender differences, boys in that age group had a slightly lower
probability than girls to work, in both years 1998 and 2003 and relative to 1994.
The difference between the coefficient estimated in col. (2) and col. (3) suggest
that boys more frequently combined school and work. The findings in Table
3 in conjunction with those in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that in 1998 both, boys
and girls in food crop households, were affected by lower enrolment, however,
whereas for boys the effect seems mainly to have happened via delayed entry,
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for girls it seems mainly to have happened via a withdraw from school at older
ages and an increase of their participation in farm and house work.
6.5 First conclusions
All results above suggest that food crop farmers were significantly hit by the
drought and the rise in food prices and that they responded to the associated
loss in purchasing power by reducing children’s school enrolment and letting
them work more often. It is also important to highlight that child work among
cotton farmers did not increase relative to child work among food crop farmers
despite the boom in the cotton sector.
6.6 Income elasticity of school enrolment
6.6.1 Identification strategy
The simultaneous shocks induced by the cereal crises and the cotton boom
caused a variation in income over time and household groups, which can help
to identify the causal impact of household income on children’s schooling. I rely
on the period 1994 to 1998 for identification since this is the period in which
both shocks occurred. In order to test the symmetry of negative and positive
shocks, it would in principle also be interesting to analyze the income elasticity
over the period 1998 to 2003. However, two reasons prevent doing this. First,
as mentioned above, information on school enrolment in 2003 is potentially
biased. Second, the positive income shock after 1998 is almost identical among
cotton and food crop farmers. Both groups experienced an growth in household
expenditure per capita of about 36 percent. Hence, there is no differential in
growth rates that could be used for identification.
I use expenditure as a proxy for income, thus ignoring the role of savings.
This implies that, if consumption smoothing or insurance (or both) take place,
for which again there is only weak evidence in Burkina Faso, the relationship
which is analyzed is rather between permanent or average income and schooling
than between current income and schooling.
A standard OLS model of the income effect can be written as follows:






Enrolment, Sijt, is a binary variable taking the value one, if the child i, living
in province j is enrolled in school in year t. Cottonijt takes the value one if
the child lives in a cotton household. Y eart takes the value one if the child is
observed in 1998 (and zero if observed in 1994). The variable ln Incijt stands
for the logarithm of household expenditures. I do not express expenditures
in per capita terms, because this could lead to identification problems in an
enrolment equation, given that fertility and educational investments might be
jointly determined and have the same unobservable determinants. However, if
household composition responds to income shocks, income may have an omitted
variable bias. Whether this is an issue will be examined below. The coefficient
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δ measures the income elasticity of school enrolment. Given that the unob-
servable characteristics of children living in the same household are likely to be
correlated, I use robust standard errors for inference.
Ageijtk are age-specific dummies for each age group between seven and
thirteen years with the age of six being the reference group. X ′ijt is a vector of
other household and individual control variables, including parental education,
position of the child in the household, and variables reflecting the composition
of the household. θj are province fixed effects which account for differences in
the rate of return to education and school supply and quality. Obviously, I have
to assume that education supply and the prices relevant for enrolment decisions
did not change in a different way for both groups of farmers. Unfortunately
data on the number and placement of schools is for this period not publicly
available and hence this issue cannot be further explored.10
I do also not account for direct or indirect schooling costs. Precise informa-
tion about direct schooling costs are not published, but the substitution effect
stemming from the relative price change between food and school related items
can be assumed to be very small compared to the income effect. The effect
of indirect costs seems also not very important, because as Table 3 showed,
children in cotton farming households have worked much less in 1998 compared
to 1994, not more. Moreover, the survey provides only very limited information
about earnings of children in the concerned age group.
The OLS estimate of the income effect above is obviously subject to a num-
ber of biases. In principle, the most important ones are the simultaneity bias
and the omitted variables bias. The simultaneity bias arises if enrolment is a
substitute for child work and thus has a negative impact on household income.
Simultaneity would bias δ downward. Omitted variable bias can stem from a
number of causes and can introduce a downward or upward bias. For instance,
unobserved parental abilities may have a positive impact on income and make
it more likely that parents send their children to school. This would upward
bias the income effect. Household income could also be correlated with better
opportunities for children to get a job which requires a certain level of educa-
tion. This would increase the expected returns from education and thus again
bias the income effect upward.
A further downward bias of the income effect may result from measurement
error in the income variable. Although for most industrialized countries that
bias should be relatively small, in the case of a poor agrarian country that bias
can be very important and may even dominate the two other biases. However,
it is not straightforward to get a rough estimate to what extent measurement
error could bias the income effect. Validation surveys are frequently conducted
in industrialized countries (see e.g., Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001), but
do not exist for the Sub-Saharan African context.
In order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the income effect on school en-
rolment, I rely on the distinct development of incomes of food crop and cotton
10In a personal interview, staff from the Ministe`re de l’Enseignement de Base et de
l’Alphabe´tisataion stated that there were at least no systematic differences in school construc-
tion between villages that are dominated by cotton farmers and villages that are dominated
by food crop farmers.
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farmers in the period 1994 to 1998. I use a 2SLS estimator and instrument
income with the interaction effect ‘being a child in a cotton household in 1998’
conditional on ‘being in a cotton household’ and the time effect. Using this
instrumentation strategy, Equation (1) can be rewritten as:






where the first stage equation is given by





ijtν + ξj + ωijt.
Given the differences in enrolment patterns for boys and girls, I run the
regression separately for boys and girls.11
Obviously a number of assumptions have to be verified to ensure that this
instrumentation is valid and yields an unbiased income effect. First, the in-
strument needs to be relevant. That this is the case, was shown in Table 1.
Whereas food crop farmers and cotton farmers had a similar living standard in
1994, cotton farmers were significantly richer than food crop farmers in 1998.
After 1998, incomes of both groups followed again a similar dynamic. Second,
I assume that being a child in a cotton household in that particular year 1998
is uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation of (2), i.e. the in-
strument does not have any direct impact on school enrolment other than its
impact through income, once the linear effect of time and ‘being a child in a
cotton household’ is controlled for. Note that there is no evidence that children
in cotton households worked more often following the cotton boom (cf. Table
3). Third, I assume that children in cotton households and food crop house-
holds would have known the same change in school enrolment over time in the
absence of the shocks on income. Table 2 shows at least that the cotton dummy
is insignificant. Here it should also be noted, that during that time, there was a
very homogenous and stable education supply within and even across provinces
(although I control for province fixed effects). Thus, there is no evidence that
villages that were dominated by cotton farmers had more or better schools
than villages dominated by food crop farmers. During that time there was also
no larger-scale school construction program in place. The expansion of educa-
tion supply started later, in the early 2000s, when the first ‘Poverty Reduction
Strategy’ was implemented.
Table 4 shows the differences over time in the observable education-related
variables for all survey years and both types of children, those living in cot-
ton households and those living in food crop households. The table also shows
11The model could also be estimated using a probit specification. However, for interpreta-
tional convenience and to avoid inconsistent estimates given that fixed effects are included, I
use the linear specification.
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the differences in the changes over time between both groups. Larger differ-
ences in the changes over time only arise in variables that track changes in the
household composition and the age of the household head. The latter difference
can however be explained by the difference of the timing of the interviews in
each survey year. Regarding the household composition it can be noted that
the average share of children that are children of the household head follows a
different trend over time for both groups. Whereas for children in food crop
households this share increases, it decreases for children in cotton households.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to find out what
exactly drives this structural change. It could imply that some children that
lived originally in food crop households, but were not children of the household
head were fostered by cotton households when incomes started to diverge be-
tween both groups. This would also be consistent with the observed changes
of household size over time; which slightly increases for cotton farmers (+0.25)
and slightly decreases for food crop farmers (-0.3). Akresh (2005) has shown
that, for instance, households in the Bazega province—which is outside the area
which is covered by this study—rely on child fostering to mitigate shocks. He
also showed (Akresh, 2004) that the foster children are equally likely as their
host siblings to be enrolled and they are slightly more likely to be enrolled than
their biological siblings, but both the foster children and their biological siblings
experience increased enrolment after the fostering exchange. If that would also
be the case in the context analyzed here, it would mean that I underestimate the
income elasticity of school enrolment. However, the bias should be moderate,
since household size in cotton households increases only slightly and the share
of children in the relevant age group (6-13) increases by only 1.2 percentage
points in cotton households and does even not decline (but rather increase) in
food crop households. All these variables will be included as control variables
in the regression. I will also run regressions where I control for livestock and
non-farm business ownership. However, both variables are not very precisely
measured and may in addition lead to further endogeneity problems. Hence I
will only briefly report the results but not include them in the preferred and
presented regressions.
[insert Table 4]
Finally the instrumentation would pose complications if the cotton boom
provided an incentive to food crop farmers to switch to cotton production. If
those switching households differed in unobservable characteristics correlated
with their decisions regarding children’s school enrolment, the estimated in-
come effect could again be biased. Between 1994 and 1998 the share of cotton
households, i.e. households which produced at least 1kg of cotton, increased
by 13 percentage points from 21 percent to 34 percent.12 To account for the
potential bias in the estimates due to switching households, I undertake below
a number of robustness checks.
12Between 1998 to 2003 this share increased by another 4.9 percentage points.
16
6.6.2 Results
Table 5 shows the estimation results. For boys the OLS estimate in column (1)
suggests that a ten percent increase in household income leads to an increase
in the probability of being enrolled of 0.73 percent (p > 0.001), controlling for
age, year, household type and province fixed effects. For girls (column (5)) this
elasticity is only 0.16 percent and not significantly different from zero (p = 0.17).
The cotton dummy is insignificant, supporting the identification strategy for the
income effect below. The 1998 year dummy indicates that in 1998 enrolment
rates were on average lower by ten percentage points for boys and five percentage
points for girls. If income is instrumented (cols. (2) and (6)) the income effect
rises substantially. For boys the income effect increases to 0.22, suggesting that
an increase of income by ten percent increases the probability of enrolment, on
average, by 2.2 percent: that is roughly three times the effect suggested by the
OLS regression. The F -statistic in the corresponding first-stage regression is
far above the critical value of ten, indicating again that the used instrument
is relevant (Stock and Yogo, 2002). For girls the instrumented income effect is
even higher (0.33) than for boys and again, the F -statistic indicates that the
instrument is relevant. The cotton dummy is still insignificant. The higher
elasticity for girls must be driven in particular by enrolment changes of girls in
the age group ten to thirteen, since in younger age groups enrolment declined
more for boys.
[insert Table 5]
In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) I introduce additional regressors, in partic-
ular parental education and household composition, including the position of
the child in the household relative to the household head. For boys the OLS
effect slightly declines, whereas the instrumented effect increases to 0.25. The
F -statistic of the first stage regression further increases; thus is well beyond the
critical threshold. For girls the instrumented income effect declines to 0.30, thus
comes closer to the effect estimated for boys. Parental education has (or more
precisely education of the household head and his/her spouse) a significant pos-
itive impact on enrolment rates. Interestingly the household’s head education
is more important for girls than for boys. The opposite is true for the edu-
cation of the spouse of the household head. Here the effect is larger for boys.
Whereas for girls the parental education effect does not differ a lot between the
OLS and IV estimates, the effects decline in the case of boys, suggesting that
a simple OLS estimation attributes parts of the income effect to the parental
education effect. For both, boys and girls, the comparison of the OLS income
effect with the instrumented income effect suggests that the simultaneity bias
and the measurement error bias probably dominate, provided that the omitted
variable bias would rather upward than downward bias the OLS effect.
I also estimated the models in columns (4) and (8) by adding business
ownership and livestock ownership to the set of controls (results not presented
in Table 5), although as discussed above, their inclusion is not without problems,
mainly because of potential endogeneity issues. However, the estimated income
effects are for both, boys and girls, robust to the inclusion of these controls.
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Livestock ownership has a negative effect on boys’ enrolment, probably due
to the fact that boys are often involved in herding of cattle. Ownership of a
private non-farm business also has a positive impact. This can be due either to
a wealth effect or to a returns on education effect. If education is particularly
valuable for the ‘management’ of a non-farm business, parents owning such a
business may invest more in the education of their children. For girls, both
variables are insignificant.
I also added the square root of household size as a control variable (results
not presented in Table 5) to account for the fact that households may respond
to income shocks by adjusting their household size. Indeed, if household size
is controlled, the instrumented income effect increases further (by about 0.05
points), showing that income and household size are positively correlated. As
I discussed above, it is possible that some cotton households fostered children
from food crop households which then led to lower income growth in per capita
terms than in absolute terms. This can also explain the lower F -statistic,
though still above ten for boys and girls.
Before I present further robustness checks, it is important to discuss the local
character of the IV estimate. As pointed out by Angrist and Imbens (1995), the
parameter that is obtained via instrumentation captures a weighted average of
causal responses to a unit change in treatment, for those whose treatment status
is affected by the instrument. Inspection of the cumulative income distribution
functions for cotton and food crop farmers in 1994 and 1998 and their double
difference (by percentile) reveal that the double difference is positive along the
entire income distribution (i.e. cotton farmers experienced a smaller decline in
real income than food crop farmers). However, this double difference is slightly
more pronounced in the bottom 40 percent of the distribution. This implies
that the instrumented income effect may not be fully representative for the
entire income distribution. It may also imply that the increase of the IV effect
relative to the OLS effect partly stems from a possibly higher income elasticity
of schooling at the bottom of the distribution. However, the variation of the
double difference across the distribution is relatively limited suggesting that the
IV estimate constitutes a fairly representative income effect.
6.6.3 Robustness checks
If households which started to grow cotton after 1994 differed in their unobserv-
able characteristics correlated with their decisions regarding children’s school
enrolment, the estimated income effect could be biased. In order to test the
robustness of the estimates in Table 5, with respect to this specific issue, I re-
estimate the model under various alternative assumptions. Table 6 shows the
results. In all these tests there is generally little case for weak instruments,
except in a few instances.
First, I introduce in Equation (2) an interaction term between ‘being a
cotton farmer in 1998’ and ‘having not been a cotton farmer the season before’
(i.e. in 1996/97).13 For boys, the income effects for both estimations, OLS and
13In absence of panel data, I cannot refer to the the season 1993/94.
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IV, remain more or less unchanged. The F -statistic of the first-stage regression
of the IV estimation goes even further up, showing that, once controlled for
the ‘newcomer status’, ‘being a cotton farmer in 1998’ is even more strongly
correlated with income. For girls, the interaction term is significantly positive.
The instrumented income effect is slightly lower but remains significant at ten
percent. In the next row, I merge all households who joined the cotton sector
after 1997 with food crop farmers. This reallocates about seven percent of all
children. The instrumented income effect for boys is close to the estimate in
Table 5 and for girls the effect decreases and is now similar to the effect for
boys.
[insert Table 6]
Another way of dealing with the problem of households which switched to
cotton production is to merge those households which produced only relatively
small quantities of cotton with food crop farmers. The assumption is that new
cotton farmers allocate on average less land to cotton than well-experienced
cotton farmers.14 Of course, the risk is that this systematically excludes cotton
farmers who do not have much land and are thus relatively poor. I use two
alternative cut-off points. The first eliminates all farmers who produced less
than 50kg of cotton, which reallocates about 3.5 percent of the cotton farmers
from the sample. The second cut-off point reallocates all farmers who produced
less than 250kg of cotton, which reallocates about 8.5 percent of the cotton
farmers to food crop households.15 With the first cut-off point the results for
boys lead to a lower IV estimate. For girls the relevant first-stage F -statistic
gets close to ten and the income effect turns out be insignificant. Using the
second cut-off point, the instrumentation also looses its power for boys and the
instrumented income effect increases substantially. However, the second cut-off
point is really far beyond the upper boundary and obviously reallocates not
only ‘newcomers’, but poor cotton farmers as well. I did a similar robustness
check by reallocating households based on their share of their total agricultural
income from cotton (results not presented in Table 6). Again I used two cut-off
points, the first at ten percent (reallocating about four percent of all cotton
households) and the second at 50 percent (reallocating about ten percent).
The IV estimates of the income effect increase for boys and girls, more so when
the higher cut-off point is used. With the 50 percent cut-off point the income
elasticity of enrolment is 0.22 for boys and 0.29 for girls. Both effects are
significant.
I also tested whether all results hold if instead of reallocating those house-
holds which probably recently joined, I remove them from the group of cotton
farmers. The results were very similar. All effects hold, except for the variant
where those households are defined as ‘joiners’, which earned less than 50% of
14Note that the size of the plots allocated to cotton and cultivated land size in general is
not available in the surveys.
15Note that quantities can only be computed approximately since respondents had the pos-
sibility to provide the quantities in terms of the number of baskets, sacks etc. This information
was then converted into kg.
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their agricultural income from cotton production. This again is a very high
threshold. These robustness checks suggest that activity changes do not drive
the results and do not lead to a substantial bias in my estimates.
The estimates obtained in this paper are also fully consistent with other
studies that have tried to identify the causal impact of income on school en-
rolment. Cogneau and Jedwab (2008) used a negative shock on cocoa prices
for identification and estimated that in Coˆte d’Ivoire a 10 percent decline in
income led to a 3.2 percentage points decline in school enrolment. Using data
for Conakry, the capital of Guinea, another West-African country, Glick and
Sahn (2000) estimated the income elasticity of school enrolment for girls in the
age group 10 to 18 at 0.257, or a 2.6 percentage points change in enrolment per
10 percent change in income. However, for boys they only find an insignificant
income effect. The analysis controls for household random effects, but does not
account for reverse causality and measurement error, which may explain the
insignificant effect for boys. Deininger (2003) found for Uganda, using a simple
probit framework, an elasticity of 0.12 for the 6 to 12 age group. This is lower
than my estimates, but in his paper Deininger (2003) does also not address a
potential bias through reverse causality and measurement error, which, again,
may explain the lower estimate. Finally, the estimates of this study can be
compared with those obtained by Glewwe and Jacoby (2004). Although they
study the case of Vietnam, so clearly a different context from West-Africa, they
use panel data and deal very carefully with all identification issues. For children
in the 10 to 18 age group they find an elasticity of about 0.2 to 0.3, depending
on the chosen specification. This is again very close to the estimates obtained
in this study.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed the income elasticity of school enrolment in an African,
poor and rural context. I find strong and robust effects. Relying on an instru-
mental variable strategy for identification, the estimates suggest that a decline
in income by ten percent causes a decline in enrolment rates among boys six to
thirteen years old by about 2.2 to 2.8 percentage points. This impact is three
to four times higher than what a simple OLS regression would imply. For girls
I find an elasticity that is slightly higher. It is important to note that the OLS
estimate is probably not only downward biased because of a ‘simultaneity bias’
but also because of ‘measurement error bias’. I have shown that these estimates
are in line with the few other studies that have tried to identify the causal im-
pact of income on school enrolment in West-Africa. So far, existing evidence
comes mostly from developed countries or from Latin-America and South-Asia,
and is often based on an analysis of conditional cash transfer programs. Given
the conditionality in these latter programs it is generally difficult to derive from
them the direct effect of parental income. In addition, it is unlikely that these
results can be generalized to the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that this
region has by far the lowest education levels in the world, the results from this
paper should be particularly policy relevant. They may of course not apply to
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Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, but are probably at least transferable to other
rural areas in francophone West-Africa: All these countries inherited more or
less the same schooling system, rural areas are usually very poor; many house-
holds engage in cash crop production, market integration of food crop farmers
is rather low and enrolment rates are fare behind the targets specified in the
MDGs, in particular for girls.
It is however important to emphasize the local character of the estimates
in this paper. They are identified from a negative and probably largely unan-
ticipated shock. Hence, the results may not be transferable to a positive shock
or an anticipated permanent shock such as a permanent income transfer. Also
they do not fully account for general equilibrium effects. What I show is that
income matters for school enrolment, and by how much, if income falls in a con-
text in which households face tight liquidity constraints. The results can thus
provide the basis for safety net policies, such as unconditional income transfers
in times of recession, but less so for permanent income transfers.
In the presented case the considered shock had a sizable impact, that prob-
ably could have been prevented with an appropriate policy response. Between
1994 and 1998 Burkinabe` food crop farmers experienced on average a decline of
more than 30 percent in their real income. As shown this led to a substantial
cut in their spending on education and a drop of more than ten percent in
enrolment rates. This corresponds to more than 100,000 children which were
not enrolled or were withdrawn from school during that period; many of them
probably permanently.
In the coming years substantial resources will be spent on programs to
increase school enrolment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of this
study imply that decision-makers should not only focus on the supply side of
education, like school construction and the training of teachers, but should also
implement measures to strengthen the demand side in times of shocks. Time
is pressing. In Burkina Faso for instance, during the world food crisis between
June 2007 and June 2008 cereal consumer prices rose again by 110%.16
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School enrolment, child work and
real yearly household expenditure per capita
(in 1000 CFA Francs, population weighted)
Cotton households Food crop households
Diff. Diff. Diff. in
1994 1998 1994-1998 1994 1998 1994-1998 Diff.
Househ. expend p.c. 62 52 10.0*** 61.5 43.4 18.1*** 8.1***
(0.976) (0.522) (1.107) (0.556) (0.316) (0.639) (0.531)
Enrolment, 6-13 years
Boys 0.308 0.259 -0.049 0.313 0.189 -0.124*** -0.076***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.026) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
Girls 0.213 0.198 -0.015 0.205 0.125 -0.080*** -0.065***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.026) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013)
Enrolment, 10-13 years
Boys 0.253 0.297 0.044 0.312 0.227 -0.086*** 0.130***
(0.036) (0.019) (0.041) (0.021) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021)
Girls 0.174 0.224 0.050 0.233 0.148 -0.085*** 0.135***
(0.033) (0.020) (0.039) (0.019) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020)
Child work, 10-13 years
Boys 0.806 0.732 -0.074** 0.733 0.780 0.047* 0.121***
(0.032) (0.019) (0.037) (0.020) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020)
Girls 0.807 0.785 -0.022 0.674 0.817 0.143*** 0.165***
(0.034) (0.020) (0.040) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021)
Notes: In parentheses robust standard errors of estimated means. ∗ significant at the 10%
level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level.
Source: EP1, EP2; estimations by the author.
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Table 2
Temporal pattern of differential enrolment rates and school expenditures




School enrolment Schooling expend. Schooling expend.
6-13 years old per househ. member per child 6-13 y. old
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Cotton Househ. -0.001 0.029 0.795 0.511 0.989 * 0.566
Year 1998 -0.081 *** 0.022 -1.398 *** 0.327 -1.401 *** 0.365
Year 2003 -0.005 0.024 -0.305 0.330 -0.166 0.367
Cotton × Year 1998 0.064 ** 0.032 1.462 ** 0.620 1.288 * 0.688
Cotton × Year 2003 -0.019 0.033 -0.372 0.617 -0.778 0.685
Boy 0.101 *** 0.023
Boy × Cotton 0.011 0.017
Boy × Year 1998 -0.044 * 0.025
Boy × Year 2003 -0.026 0.026
Household Head Male 0.513 0.423 0.880 * 0.476
Observations 12273 6610 6610
(children) (households) (households)
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the
5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regression (1) also controls for age and relationship
of child to household head. Intercept included but not reported here. Reference year is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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Table 3
Temporal pattern of child work




School enrolment Work (Def. 1) Work (Def. 2)
10-13 years old 10-13 years old 10-13 years old
Cotton Househ. -0.048 0.042 0.112 *** 0.041 0.095 ** 0.044
Year 1998 -0.079 ** 0.035 0.130 *** 0.035 0.168 ** 0.035
Year 2003 -0.014 0.037 0.004 0.038 0.053 0.038
Cotton × Year 1998 0.123 *** 0.045 -0.136 *** 0.044 -0.167 *** 0.047
Cotton × Year 2003 0.031 0.047 -0.062 0.047 -0.044 0.050
Boy 0.080 ** 0.036 0.052 0.035 0.019 0.036
Boy × Cotton -0.010 0.027 -0.033 0.028 -0.013 0.029
Boy × Year 1998 -0.001 0.038 -0.079 ** 0.038 -0.065 * 0.039
Boy × Year 2003 0.028 0.041 -0.096 ** 0.041 -0.092 ** 0.042
Observations 5319 5319 5319
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-
family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ significant at the
5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Definition 1 of ‘work’ assumes that children who
combine school and work mainly work; definition 2 assumes that they mainly attend school.
Regressions also control for age and relationship of child to household head. Intercept included
but not reported here. Reference year is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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Table 4
Characteristics of children (6 to 13 years old) and the households they live in (means)
Initial levels, difference over time by group and differences in differences
(Differences over time are computed as (t+ 1) - (t))
1994 1994-1998 1998-2003
Level 1994 Diff. 1994-1998 Diff. 1998-2003
Food crop Cotton Food crop Cotton Diff. in diff. Food crop Cotton Diff. in diff.
Age (years) 9.054 9.055 0.148* 0.129 -0.019 0.003 -0.071 -0.074***
Boy (=1) 0.540 0.552 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.019* -0.029** -0.010
Child of household head (=1) 0.783 0.821 0.089*** -0.048*** -0.136*** 0.008 0.126*** 0.118***
Household size (=1) 9.101 10.959 -0.306 0.254 0.560 -0.744*** -2.145*** -1.402**
Share female househ. members 0.496 0.477 0.013 0.015 0.002 0.014** 0.014* 0.000
Share children 6-13 in household 0.294 0.277 0.029*** 0.012 -0.016 -0.008 0.009 0.017
Household head male (=1) 0.914 0.967 0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.023* 0.004 0.027
Household head age (years) 46.358 45.229 1.352 2.089** 0.737 0.119 -1.058 -1.178
Household head migr. last 5 years (=1) 0.062 0.025 0.004 0.030* 0.026 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household head some primary (=1) 0.061 0.089 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.001
Household head primary compl. (=1) 0.028 0.056 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Spouse of head some primary (=1) 0.045 0.054 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.007 0.008
Notes: The means of ‘Age’, ‘Boy’ and ‘Child of household head’ are computed over all children. The remaining variables are means over all households to
which the children belong. ∗ difference significant at the 10% level, ∗∗ difference significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ difference significant at the 1% level.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; computations by the author.
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Table 5
The income elasticity of school enrolment, 1994 – 1998
Children 6 to 13 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Boys
Main equation
Cotton Househ. -0.013 0.023 -0.042 0.034 -0.012 0.022 -0.047 0.033
Year 1998 -0.100 *** 0.019 -0.116 *** 0.022 -0.093 *** 0.018 -0.112 *** 0.021
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.073 *** 0.012 0.220 * 0.126 0.067 *** 0.012 0.248 ** 0.127
HH head some primary 0.102 *** 0.034 0.093 *** 0.035
Spouse some primary 0.205 *** 0.054 0.157 *** 0.056
Age effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls (see note) no no yes yes
Province fixed-effects yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998
F -Stat 24.1 26.7
Observations 4359 4359 4359 4359
Notes: See next page.
28
Table 5 (... continued.)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Girls
Main equation
Cotton Househ. 0.012 0.022 -0.048 0.041 0.007 0.022 -0.038 0.034
Year 1998 -0.054 *** 0.018 -0.081 *** 0.023 -0.047 *** 0.018 -0.074 *** 0.022
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.016 0.012 0.334 * 0.178 0.019 0.012 0.297 * 0.160
HH head some primary 0.147 *** 0.039 0.147 *** 0.035
Spouse some primary 0.128 *** 0.047 0.134 *** 0.048
Age effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls (see note) no no yes yes
Province fixed-effects yes yes yes yes
First stage
IV: Being a cotton
farmer in 1998
F -Stat 13.5 16.2
Observations 3708 3708 3708 3708
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the
10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Additional controls (cols. (3), (4), (7) and (8) include being the eldest child in the
household, being a child of the household head, the share of female household members, the share of children 6-13 years old in the household and whether
the household head is a male. Intercept included but not reported here. The first-stage regression includes also all other variables from the main equation as
instruments. Base year for year effects is 1994.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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Table 6
The income elasticity of school enrolment, 1994 – 1998 — Robustness checks
Children 6 to 13 years old
Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Interaction term: Household was not a cotton household in previous year
Cotton Househ. -0.016 0.024 -0.053 0.036 -0.014 0.023 -0.053 0.035
Cotton × No Cott. in t− 1 0.016 0.033 0.043 0.035 0.088 ** 0.037 0.096 *** 0.032
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.067 *** 0.012 0.227 ** 0.116 0.019 0.012 0.251 * 0.155
First stage F -Stat 30.6 16.5
Cotton households having not been a cotton household in previous year are merged with food-crop farmersa
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.064 *** 0.013 0.252 ** 0.105 0.019 0.013 0.235 * 0.131
First stage F -Stat 38.1 22.9
Cotton households having produced less than 50kg cotton are merged with food-crop farmersb
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.068 *** 0.013 0.230 * 0.138 0.022 * 0.013 0.261 0.178
First stage F -Stat 20.2 11.7
Cotton households having produced less than 250kg cotton merged with food-crop farmersc
Ln Expenditure (IV) 0.063 *** 0.013 0.465 0.301 0.021 * 0.013 0.502 ** 0.248
First stage F -Stat 5.6 6.2
Notes: Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and permit within-family correlations among unobservables. ∗ significant at the
10% level, ∗∗ significant at the 5% level, ∗∗∗ significant at the 1% level. Regressions correspond to those presented in Table 5 (columns (3), (4), (7) and (8)).
a Procedure re-allocates 6.45 percent of all boys and 7.18 percent of all girls. b Procedure re-allocates 3.66 percent of all boys and 3.42 percent of all girls. c
Procedure re-allocates 8.71 percent of all boys and 8.44 percent of all girls.
Source: EP1, EP2, EP3; estimations by the author.
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Figure 1
























Notes: Total food means tons of millet, sorghum and maize.
Source: Economic Accounts for the Agricultural Sector, based on Enqueˆte Agricole (data not
available for harvests before 1996).
Figure 2




















Notes: Annual average prices (collected on 37 different regional markets).
Source: Cereal prices: Grain Market Price Surveillance System, Ministry of Trade. Cotton price:
Ouedraogo, Sanou and Sissao (2003).
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